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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of Utah
ANIERICAN INVEST~IENT CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE TAX COMl\fiSSION OF
UTAH, and IRvVIN ARNOVITZ,
R E. HAMMOND, H. P. LE~
THA1f and B. H. ROBINSON, the
members of said Commission,

Case No.
8312

Defendants.

BRIEF FOR THE COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We cannot do otherwise than question the good
faith of plaintiff in making the statements as to the
facts which are contained in plaintiff's brief. At the
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top of Page 2 and at Page 4 are palpable misstatements
of fact. Plaintiff is described as ''a corporation organized under and by virtue of the Laws of the State of
Nevada, and with its principal place of business at Ely,
Nevada". At Pages 16 and 26, this same misstatement
is implied in the argument and conclusion n1ade, and
it is apparent that this wrong position is the essential
part of plaintiff's petition before this Court.
Plaintiff has not even paid the State Tax Commission the respect of referring to its decision which includes findings of fact and certain conclusions. In that
decision, finding No. II is as follows:
''During the year 1937 the books of the company were located at Ogden, Utah; directors'
n1eetings were held at Ogden, Utah; income was
received and dividends disbursed from Ogden,
Utah; and stock certificates were held there."
Conclusion No. II made by the Commission reads
as follows:
'''Petitioner's principal place of business during 1937 was at Ogden, Utah, and it had no place
of business in any other state."
Of course, petitioner is entitled to attack this decision and show that it is not supported by the evidence.
But we cannot do other than feel aggrieved when the
Commission's decision does not even n1erit the courtesy
of repudiation.
The facts contained in the record, however, are as
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definite as the findings and conclusions of the Commission's decision indicate. The only sworn witness at the
hearing was ~lr. J. Leo Cooney, the treasurer of the
con1pany. He testified that the c01npany's books were
kept in his office in Ogden until about the first of the
year 1939, when they were n1oved to Elko, Nevada
(Tr. 19); that all of the company's directors' meetings
were held in Ogden in 1937 (Tr. 20); that the president
and secretary of the con1pany resided in Ogden in 1937
(Trs. 20-21), in addition to the treasurer, and that the
two vice-presidents resided in Idaho (Tr. 21); that the
stock certificates of the company were held in Ogden
(Tr. 21); and that the company's funds which gave rise
to dividends were kept in the First Security Bank at
Ogden (Trs. 21-22). There is not one word of testimony
in the transcript that petitioner had its principal place
of business, or any other place of business, at Ely,
Nevada, or any place else in Nevada or other than in
the State of Utah, in the year 1937. The above-quoted
finding of fact and conclusion, taken from the decision
of the Commission, must therefore stand as establishing
that the plaintiff's only place of business during 1937
was at Ogden, Utah.
The balance of the statement of the facts in plaintiff's brief is accurate, including the statement on Page
3 as to the revenue of plaintiff in the year 1937.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The difference in the fundamental fact as to where
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plaintiff's principal place of business was located in
1937 will alter much of plaintiff's argument and admittedly makes a vast difference in the validity of the Corporation Franchise Tax Law as applied to plaintiff.
The questions discussed by plaintiff's brief may be
stated as follows:
1. Is plaintiff a holding company within the
exemption provisions of R. S. U., 80-13-5
(16)?

2. Does the Corporation Franchise Tax Law
apply to plaintiff?

3. As applicable to plaintiff, is the Corporation Franchise Tax valid~
ARGUMENT

I.

Is Plaintiff a Holding Company Within the Exemption Provisions of R. S. U., 80-13-5 (16)?
The holding con1pany exemption provision reads as
follows:
''Corporations whose sole business consists
of holding the stock of other corporations for
the purpose of controlling the management of
affairs of such other corporations, if such other
corporations make returns under this chapter.''
It is admitted by plaintiff that it is not engaged
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solely in holding the stock of other corporations for
the purpose of managing then1, the statement being that
plaintiff is ''primarily'' engaged in such business.
(Brief, pp.2, 4.) The difference between engaging primarily in an activity and engaging solely in the activity
is certainly plain, since engaging solely in an activity
means that nothing else is engaged in. The word '' primarily'', on the other hand, raises a question of degree,
and if activities other than holding company functions
represent fron1 one to, let us say, forty-five per cent of a
cmnpany's business, it would still be primarily engaged
as a holding company. The indefiniteness of the word
"primarily" may possibly be the reason its use was
avoided by the Legislature. This interpretation cornports also with the latter part of the exemption provision, which requires that the subsidiary corporations
must make returns under the Franchise Tax Law before
the exemption arises. Because of this, if any corporation is primarily engaged in holding company functions and all of its subsidiaries make returns under the
act, but it also has investment functions as to which no
returns are made under the Franchise Tax Law, there
is a pro tanto failure to cover the privilege of doing
business in the state, and that failure is in direct proportion to the volume of the investn1ent business of the
corporation. Exemptions from tax are always strictly
construed since they are not favored in the law. Cooley
on Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 672 and cases there cited.
Even if it be argued that where one branch of a
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company's business is incidental to its chief business
activity, no special tax will be applied to the incidental
portion, such argument would not be available to plaintiff. The investment features of plaintiff's business
represent a definite portion of its business and for the
year 1937 gave rise to more than 40% of its total income.
In Kehrer v. $tewart, 197 U. S. 60, 68-69, 25 S. Ct.
403, 49 L. Ed. 663, the question arose whether a Chicago
meat packing firn1 which shipped meat to Georgia for
sale was subject to a Georgia tax, some of the meat being
shipped pursuant to order and, therefore, a part of
interstate commerce, and a very minor part being shipped without previous order and, therefore, a part of
intrastate commerce in Georgia. In determining the
importance of the latter portion of the business, the
court said:
''The record does not show what proportion
of such business is interstate and what proportion
is domestic, although it is conceded that most of
the business is interstate in its character. If the
amount of domestic business were purely nominal,
as, for instance, if the consignee of a shipment
made in Chicago upon an order filled there, refused the goods shipped, and the only way. of
disposing of them was by sales at Atlanta, this
might be held to be strictly incidental to an interstate business, and in reality a part of it, as we
held in Crutcher v. l{entucky, 141 U. S. 47; but
if the agent carried on a definite, though a minor,
part of his business in the State by the sales of
meat there, he would not escape the payment of
the tax, since the greater or less magnitude of
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the business cuts no figure in the impo~ition of
the tax. There could be no doubt whatever that,
if the agent carried on his interstate and domestic
business in two distinct establishments, one would
be subject and the other would not be subject to
the tax, and in our view it 1i1akes no difference
that the two branches of business are car:I·ied
on in the sau1e establishn1ent."
'Vhen the Legislature used the word "solely", the
law will not be observed if in interpreting it the test
is "prin1arily".
Plaintiff refers to First Security Corporation of
Ogden v. State Tax Commission, 91 Utah 101, 63 Pac.
(2d) 1062, as supporting its views. With petitioner's
analysis of the First Security Corporation case and
with its application to the facts of this case, we do not
agree. It is true that in the First Security Corporation
case, according to the agreed statement of ·facts, the
First Security Corporation held stock of the Amalgamated Sugar Company, which it bought, held or sold
for investment as did the taxpayer in this case. But
this fact was not considered by the Supreme Court in
its opinion; on the contrary, it was assumed by the
Court that the corporation was solely engaged in holding stock for the purpose of control and management
of the corporations. At Page 107 of 91 Utah, the Court
thus quoted the one question submitted by the taxpayer
in that case :
"~fay the legislature of the State of Utah
impose on the First Security Corporation of
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Ogden a franchise tax from which it would be
wholly exmnpt were it not for the fact that it,
a foreign corporation, is the owner of stock of
other corporations, also foreign, which do not
n1ake returns under the franchise tax laws of
this State and which (foreign corporations) transact no business and have no property in the
State of Utah, the business of the First Security
Corporation of Ogden being strictly confined to
the holding of stock in other corporations for the
purpose of controlling the management of the
affairs of such corporations, and which corporations, except those first mentioned, make returns under the Utah Law~"
The Court then went on to say:
''The reason the Tax Commission claims the
exen1ptiort does not apply to the First Security
Corporation of Ogden is that the First Security
Corporation holds stock in and manages from
Utah at least two corporations foreign to the
state of Utah doing business in the state of
Wyoming.''
And then at Pages 106 to 109, it is stated:
"It is conceded that, if it were not for the
last clause, 'if such other corporations make returns under this chapter,' the First Security
Corporation of Ogden would be within the exception and no tax could be imposed.''
And again at Page 112 the Court thus indicated
the facts which were being decided by that decision:
''We assume from the terms of the stipula-
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tion that plaintiff, in so far as this case is concerned, is a corporation whose sole business is that
of controlling and managing the affairs of other
corporations. As we understand the position of
the Tax C01nmission, plaintiff was excluded from
the exception because of the last clause of the
section exen1pting such corporation 'if such other
corporations make returns under this chapter.' ''
(Italics ours.)
Of course, the Court in that case was bound by the
stipulation of facts. In its brief in the Supreme Court,
the plaintiff First Security Corporation urged that it
was a holding company exclusively, at least so far as
its Utah business was concerned. At Page 4 of the
defendant's brief, there was italicized a portion of Section (f) of the stipulation of facts as follows:
"Its sole activities in Utah consisted in holding stockholders' meetings at which reports were
presented, and directors elected, and directors'
meetings, at which matters connected with the
control of the management of affairs of its subsidiaries were considered.''
And although it appeared in Sections (d) and (e)
of the stipulation that plaintiff owned certain stock of
the Amalgamated Sugar Company, the stipulation provided:
'' (e) 'x. * *. None of the certificates of stock
issued by said corporations and owned by the
taxpayer were kept in Utah during the period in
question.''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
It nowhere appears in the stipulation that the First
Security Corporation's only place of business was within the State of Utah, nor even that its principal place
of business was in this state; nor did it appear in what
other states, if any, this Delaware corporation had qualified and in which its investment business might have
been carried on.
That case is, therefore, far from conclusive of the
instant case, in which the facts before the Court are
different and in which there is no effort to confine the
Court to a particular legal question.
The rationale of the Court's opinion was somewhat
as follows: A holding company which holds stock of
subsidiary corporations only for the purpose of controlling and rnanaging the same is exempt from the corporation franchise tax. \Vhen a holding company holds for
such purposes stock of some subsidiaries in Utah and
some subsidiaries operating wholly without the state,
the exemption would not apply only because of the
companies' doing business outside the state. Utah cannot constitutionally require that corporations doing no
business in Utah pay a tax to the State of Utah; neither
can Utah do this indirectly by requiring that they must
pay a tax on a holding company's earnings unless they
pay a tax on the out-of-state subsidiaries' earnings. It,
therefore, follows that the First Security Corporation
need not file a corporation tax return, since it only
holds stock for the· purpose specified, and its subsidiaries
~ither file returns or are constitutionally exempt from
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the filing of returns. The decision does not go beyond
this holding.
But in this case it is adn1itted that it is not the ''sole
business'' of the taxpayer to hold stock ''for the purpose of controlling the 1nanagen1ent of affairs'' of such
corporations. Sin1ilar facts were present in the First
Security Corporation case but were not urged upon the
Court, and the Court's opinion assun1ed that the sole
business of the corporation was holding stock for the
purpose stated in Subsection (16) of R. S. U., 1933,
80-13-5. In this case, the taxpayer admitted that it did
not hold the stock of Ohio Oil Company or of Socony
Vacuum Company for the purpose of controlling the
management of the affairs of the companies. (Tr. 23.)
It was, therefore, not solely engaged in the business
of holding stocks for these purposes. This prevents the
taxpayer from coming under the exemption of Subsection (16) and makes the corporation subject to filing
of corporation franchise tax returns under the tel'lns
of the act.
The Tax Commission does not admit that the plaintiff meets the first test of the holding company exemption provision. In the First Security case the parties
wanted the Court to decide the second portion of that
exemption provision, namely, whether a failure to make
returns under the Franchise Tax Law where the subsidiaries were doing business' only in foreign states removed the objection. This Court analyzed that question
at great length and decided that such an interpretation
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of the law would be contrary to the Constitution and that
such was, therefore, not intended. We now admit that
under the First Security case, if the plaintiff is engaged
solely in holding the stocks of other companies for the
purpose of managing them and such subsidiaries either
make returns under the law or there is no power in the
State of Utah constitutionally to require returns from
such companies, then the plaintiff cannot be taxed. It
is our position that plaintiff is not engaged solely in
such business but that a very considerable portion of its
activity is investing its funds in stocks of corporations
for other purposes than managing them, and that it is,
therefore, not exempt under the holding cmnpany provision, regardless of whether the companies whose stocks
are held by plaintiff pay corporation franchise tax to
Utah.
Furthermore, we request that the Court's holding
and opinion in the First Security case be reexamined in
light of recent cases discussed under Point III of this
brief.
II.

Does the Corporation Franchise Tax Law Apply
to Plaintiff?
Plaintiff does not come under the holding company
exemption because it is not engaged solely in holding
stocks for the purpose of managing the corporations
whose stocks are owned. It is placed outside this ex-
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en1ption by reason of its business of buying and selling
the stocks of corporations for investment or speculation
purposes. This 1nakes the plaintiff subject to the Corporation Franchise Tax Law unless this law was not
1neant to apply to the business of an investment corporation. By He\yised Statutes of Utah, 80-13-1 ( 5), the
definition of doing business is made so broad as to include all the legitimate functions of a corporation. The
definition is as follows:
''The ter1n 'doing business' includes any
transaction or transactions in the course of its
business by a bank or corporation created under
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation
qualified to do or doing intrastate business in
this state, and shall include the right to do business through such incorporation or qualification.''
If this definition means what it says, a corporation
which is qualified to do business in this state is required
to pay for that franchise or privilege, regardless of
whether it exercises its franchise. This interpretation
1s reenforced by 80-13-3, which commences:
"Every bank or corporation, '" '"' '"' for the
privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or
for the privilege of doing business in the state,
shall annually pay tD the state, etc.''
Plaintiff admits that it was qualified to do business
1n the State of Utah in 1937. (Tr. 21.) This without
more would appear to bring plaintiff within the statute.
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On the assumption that plaintiff is required actually
to do business in the State of Utah before coming under
the provisions of the law, the definition of doing business
as including ''any transaction or transactions in the
course of its business'' appears to include all kinds of
business carried on by a corporation. This is corroborated by the fact that there are specific exemptions for
many types of corporations. This can mean only that
all business is included and unless exempted is subject
to the tax; and unless plaintiff con1es within Subsection
(16), the exen1ption provided for holding companies, it
is not exeinpt under the act. Further corroboration as
to the taxability of investment companies is found in
Section 21 of the act, which specifically deals with
;'rents, interest and dividends derived from business
done" either inside or outside the state. This is the
type of income accruing to investment companies which
ue by such treatment definitely placed under the act.
This question was quite definitely settled by this
Jourt in California Packing Corporation v. State Tax
Jommission, 97 Utah 367, 376-379, 93 Pac. (2d) 463,
;vhere the income from investments of the California
~acking Corporation was considered as to whether it
;hould be allocated within or without the state; and
.hat it was such income as places the corporation receiv~
ng it under the Franchise Tax Law was hnplicit in the
lecision.
But the California Packing Corporation case did
tot decide ·whether the income such as plaintiff here
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received from its Socony Vacuum stock and its Ohio Oil
stock was derived from business done within or without
the state.
Subsection (1) of 80-13-21 reads as follows:
'' Hents, interest and dividends derived frmn
business done outside this state less related expenses shall not be allocated to this state."
Subsection (3) then provides:
'' Hents, interest and dividends derived fron1
business done in this state less related expenses
shall be allocated to this state."
It is submitted that the test of where the business
giving rise to the receipt of dividends is done is not
the place where the operating company is located. A
company engaged in the making of investments and the
handling of securities for purposes of earnings and
profits is engaged in that business at the place where
its work is done. If its offices are in the State of Utah
and it simply holds the stock of corporations located
outside the state, buys and sells such shares of stock
at its Utah office, clips coupons here, and receives
dividends here, these dividends are derived '' frmn business done in this state". If, however, a Utah corporation, engaged in manufacturing in the State of Utah,
has an office in New York City, which office handles
the investment of surplus funds, makes decisions, holds
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the muniments of title and receives ·dividends, such
dividends are derived ''from business done outside this
state'' because the investment office is located outside
the state. It, therefore, appears that since the American Investment Corporation had its principal office in
Ogden and did all of the work connected with the buying, holding and selling of Ohio Oil Company and Socony
Vacuum Company stock in Utah, the receipt of dividends
fron1 these shares and the gain realized through sale of
shares was all incon1e ''derived from business done in
this state''.
This applies equally to the dividends of the operating banks controlled and managed by the taxpayer. It
is true that these banks cannot be compelled to file
returns with the State of Utah and that if the corporation is exempt except for the failure of these banks
to file returns, it would be invalid under the First Security case to hold that the holding company was not within
the exemption. But here the exemption is inapplicable
because the taxpayer holds stock for other purposes than
controlling or managing the affairs of the corporations
whose stock is so held. Once the exemption is made
inapplicable, the statute applies in toto and there is no
requiren1ent of deductions, failure to include income, or
specific allocations outside the state, unless the character
of the earnings is such as to be so treated by the
;;;pecific terms of the statute. Since the receipt of the
-lividends of the Idaho hank which is owned by the taxrmyer does not place such dividends within any of the
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deductions or allocation provisions outside the state,
such inc01ne is taxable. Nothing in First Security Corporation of Ogden v. State Tax Con11nission, supra, is
to the contrary.
In the California Packing Corporation case at
Pages 377 to ~78, after discussing the rule as to taxation
of intangibles at or apart fron1 the don1icile of the owner,
the Court said:
"But we have found no case holding that the
inc01ne from intangibles owned by a nonresident
and held by him or it outside the state, which
inc01ne is paid and received without the state,
and derived fron1 a business not operating in the
state can for any purpose or by any n1ethod be
taxed by the state. But our statute, as quoted
above, seems to n1anifest a clear intent on the
part of the legislature that so called 'financial
incon1e' not derived from business done in Utah
should not be included in gross receipts for tax
computation purposes by the state.''
The Court's use of the phrase ''derived from business done" is not as plain as could be desired, but it
was as plain as was necessary by the decision in that
case since the muniments of title there before the Court
were held outside of the state at the office where the
company's financial business was conducted, and the
stocks were of operating companies doing business outside the state. It was, therefore, apparent that the financial revenue of the California Packing Corporation was
not assignable to Utah. As to plaintiff, however, the
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facts are entirely different. Plaintiff's only place of
doing business in 1937 was within the State of Utah
where it qualified. There it maintained its office, carried
on all its corporate activities, received its income, including interest and dividends, and declared its own
dividends to its stockholders. If plaintiff was doing
business at all, it was doing business in Utah. The
franchise in question is plaintiff's franchise for carrying on its corporate functions for the year 1937. There
is no attempt to tax plaintiff for the franchises of its
subsidiaries in foreign states.
The difficulties n1entioned but not decided in the
California Packing Company case arise where the corporation is qualified in different states, having many
~ffices from some of which one kind of business is carried on and from others a different kind of business.
Here plaintiff's only office was in Utah and all the
:msiness that it did was in Utah. If the company earned
:my money, it was through the business which it carried
)n in the State of Utah, and it therefore comes within
Subsections 3 and 5 of Section 21 of the act.
Plaintiff makes the point that the capital gain from
;ale of Ohio Oil Company and Socony Vacuum stocks
vas not ''rents, interest or dividends'' and was not a
~apital gain within the meaning of Subsections 2 and
~ of Section 21, which deal with ''gains from the sale
1r exchange of capital assets consisting of real or tan~ible personal property". At Pages 23 to 25 of its hrief,
)laintiff assumes that the Commission allocated these
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gains under Subsections 2 and 4. The Commission's
decision does not so indicate. These gains are comparable to the interest and dividends allocated by Subsections
1 and 3 and could, therefore, be treated in a similar
manner under the rule of ejusdem generis. But it is
unimportant to decide whether such income is specifically
allocable in this case, because the company was doing
business only in the State of Utah. If the Court should
hold that these gains from intangibles do not come within either Subsections 1 and 3 or Subsections 2 and 4,
such income will be allocated according to Subsection 5,
which reads :
"If the bank or other corporation carried on
no business outside this state, the whole of the
remainder of net income may be allocated to
this state."
Under the Commission's decision that plaintiff was
doing business in no other state than Utah in 1937, all
of its income will be allocated to this state, whether it
be under Subsection 3, 4 or 5 of Section 21.
Plaintiff wrongfully contends that its only place of
doing business in 1937 was in Nevada. Realizing, as this
Court must, that if the corporation was qualified to do
business and was doing business only in the State of
Utah for the year 1937, it cannot reasonably be argued
that its income should be allocated outside the state
for the purpose of computing its Utah tax. Its franchise
was valuable where it was doing business, and that was
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in Utah alone. There remains only to consider whether
the statute thus applied to a foreign corporation whose
only place of business is in Utah is valid.
III.

As Applicable to Plaintiff, is the Corporation
F"ranchise Tax Valid?
It must ever be borne in mind in corporation franchise tax cases that the incident of the tax is the franchise or privilege of doing business. If a corporation is
doing business within the State of Utah or has a franchise for doing business here, it is taking advantage of
the state's laws and of the state's protective system, as
well as its opportunities and purchasing power. The
United States Supreme Court has definitely held that
where a corporation is enjoying these privileges, it
comes within the jurisdiction of the state for tax purposes. In State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Company,
decided December 16, 1940, 85 L. Ed. 222, at Page 225,
the court discussed the general power of a state to tax
~ corporation, and in that case the Supreme Court has
:sone beyond anything that was before believed taxable
:md far beyond the incidents of the present case in hold_ng a corporation taxable by a state. It thus stated the
[undamentals of the taxing power:
''For constitutional purposes the decisive
issue turns on the operating incidence of a ehal.
lenged tax. A state is free to pursue its own fiscal
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policies, unmnbarrassed by the Constitution, if
by the practical operation of a tax the state has
exerted its power in relation to opportunities
which it has given, to protection which it has
afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by
the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
''Constitutional provisions are often so glossed over with co1nn1entary that imperceptibly we
tend to construe the commentary rather than the
text. 'Ve cannot, ho·wever, be too often reminded
that the limits on the otherwise autonomous
powers of the states are those in the Constitution
and not verbal weapons in1ported into it. 'Taxable
event', 'jurisdiction to tax', 'business situs', 'extraterritoriality', are all compendious ways of
implying the impotence of state power because
state power has nothing on which to operate.
These tags are not instruments of adjudication
but statements of result in applying the snle constitutional test for a case like the present one.
That test is whether property was taken without
due process of law, or, if paraphrase we must,
whether the taxing power exerted by the state
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities
and benefits given by the state. The simple but
controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return. The substantial privilege of carrying on business in vVisconsin, which has here been given, clearly supports the tax, and the state has not given the
less merely because it has conditioned the demand
of the exaction upon happenings outside its own
borders. The fact that a tax is contingent upon
events brought to pass without a state does not
destroy the nexus between such a tax and transactions within a state for which the tax is an
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exaction. See Continental Assurance Company v.
':flennessee, supra. See also Equitable Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143; Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525; Cornpania de Tabacos v.
Collector, 275 U. S. 87, 98; New York ex rei.
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308; Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412; Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U. S. 22; Curry v.
:McCanless, 307 U. S. 357."
The dissenting opinion in that case relied on Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct.
436. The disagreement between the majority and the
n1inority was as to whether Wisconsin was affording
protection to the incident of taxation involved in the
.J. C. Penney case. As to the general principle, there
was no disagreement between the Connecticut General
case and the Penney case as above quoted. At Page 80
of 303 U. S. in the Connecticut General case, the court
said:
''But the limits of the state's legislative jurisdiction to tax, prescribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, are to be ascertained by reference to
the incidence of the tax upon its objects rather
than the ultimate thrust of the economic benefits
and burdens of transactions within the state. As a
matter of convenience and certainty, and to secure
a practically just operation of the constitutional
prohibition, we look to the state power to control
the objects of the tax as marking the boundaries
of the power to lay it. Hence it is that a state
which controls the property and activities within
its boundaries of a foreign corporation admitted
to do business there may tax then1."
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The plaintiff con1es squarely within the last section
of this quotation since its property was all held in the
State of Utah, and all of its activities were conducted in
the State of Utah in 1937. These general quotations
should be sufficient to establish validity of taxation of
plaintiff.
Our corporation franchise tax is based upon net inconle of a corporation which is allocated entirely to
Utah if the company does no business elsewhere (which
is true in this case), and is allocated partly within the
state and partly without the state where the con1pany
does business in both places. (This is the most that can
be said for plaintiff's position, although actually plaintiff contends it was not doing business in Utah. If such
be the case, we admit that the corporation is not subject
to taxation.)
One statement in the opinion in First Security Corporation demands consideration. At the bottom of Page
115, the Court said :
''A tax based on the net income of the business
done and property owned without this state by a
foreign corporation is as direct a burden on property beyond the jurisdiction of the state as is a fee·
of 25 cents on each $1,000 of authorized capital
stock of a foreign corporation.''
We have no quarrel with this statement, since it does
not state that the foreign corporation has its principal
office in Utah; but it is not accurate if meant to reflect
the constitutional limits of taxing power of a dmnestie
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corporation or a foreign corporation whose principal
or only place of business is in this state. Refer to Point
III.
It has definitely been held that a state may tax the
income of its residents whether individuals or corporations, and this question is no longer open in any state.
People ex rei. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308,
57 S. Ct. 466;
Wiseman v. Interstate Public Service Company, 191 Ark. 255, 85 S. W. (2d) 700;
Lawrence v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 162 1\fiss. 338, 137 So. 503, aff 'd. 286
u.s. 276;
Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Commission,
50 Ga. App. 660, 179 S. E. 563, aff'd. 182
Ga. 568, 186 S. E. 558.
In People v. Graves, supra, at Page 313 of the U.S.
Reports, the court said, in holding a resident subject to
tax because he enjoyed the protection of the state and
privileges which it afforded:
"Neither the privilege nor the burden is affected by the character of the source from which
the income is derived. For that reason income is
not necessarily clothed with the tax immunity
enjoyed by its source. A state may tax its residents upon net incon1e from a business whose
physical assets, located wholly without the state,
are beyond its taxing power, (Citing cases)."
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This general principle, which cannot successfully
be disputed, applies equally to foreign corporations which
have qualified within a state and there established their
principal offices. This was true in Montag Brothers v.
State Revenue Commission, supra.
This general principle was thus stated in an annotation at 98 A. L. R. 1444:
''It seen1s to be well settled that a franchise,
excise, or license tax upon domestic corporations,
measured by or based on the capital stock of the
corporation, is not unconstitutional or beyond
the power of a state, merely because such stock
represents, in whole or in part, property located
outside the state."
In line with this, it has been held that taxation of
dividends on stock held by a corporation doing business
in the taxing state, even though the company paying
the dividends operated entirely without the state, is
valid.
State ex rel. Manitowoc v. State Tax Commission, 161 Wis. 111, 152 N. W. 848;
People ex rel. New England Dressed Meat Co.
v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408, 50 N. E. 53, 41
L. R. A. 228;
Cooley on Taxation, Fourth Edition, Sees. 893,
894, 900, 1753;
Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 251(b) (Par. 1299,
C. C. H. Federal Tax Service, 1940).
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Since no two corporations operate exactly in the
same way, and since no other state has a Corporation
Franchise Tax Law just like Utah's, it is impossible to
find a case on all fours with the instant case. However,
decisions have been made in other states involving all
the questions that can be raised in this case so far as
power of the state to impose the tax is concerned, thus
establishing the validity of the tax as applied to plaintiff.
Against the objection that the interstate commerce
clause of the ~--,ederal Constitution prevents states from
taxing their incon1e, corporations have been held subject
to franchise taxes where they established offices within
a state and carried on corporate functions sufficient to
make all or a part of their property or inc01ne subject
to tax. Thus, in Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner
of Corporations of :Massachusetts, 298 U. S. 553, 56 S.
Ct. 887, 80 L. Ed. 1328, it was held that a Delaware corporation engaged in the wholesale lumber business, but
with its principal office in 1\fassachusetts, was taxable
in Massachusetts where it kept its corporate books and
records, held its directors' meetings and declared dividends, and where it maintained a sales office as the headquarters for salesmen soliciting orders both within and
outside the state, which orders were filled in interstate
commerce; but the tax there was measured by a proportion of its capital assets. And in a case resembling the
instant one very much except that the ·question of interstate commerce was raised, the court held as to the
Copper Range Company in the course of its opinion
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entitled Cheney Brothers Co. v. :Massachusetts, 246 U. S.
147, 155, 38 S. Ct. 295, 62 L. Ed. 632:
"This is a Michigan corporation whose articles of association conten1plate that it shall have
an office in Boston. It is a holding company and
owns various corporate stocks and bonds and
certain 1nineral lands in :Michigan. Its activities
in l\1:assachusetts consist in holding stockholders'
and directors' meetings, keeping corporate records and financial books of account, receiving·
n1onthly dividends from its holdings of stock, depositing the n1oney in Boston banks and paying
the same out, less salaries and expenses, as dividends to its stockholders three or four times a
year, . The exaction of a tax for the exercise of
such corporate faculties is within the power of
the State. Interstate commerce is not affected~,.,
See also the decision as to the Champion Copper
Company, which follows that as to the Copper Range
Company.
A case closely resembling the principal case is
People ex rel. Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc., v. Graves,
et al., (1937) 250 App. Div. 149, 294 N. Y. S. 995. That
case involved the taxability of a Delaware corporation
which had established an office within the State of New
York for the conduct of a general investment business.
Petitioner contended that it was not doing business within the State of New York, although it had its office there,
and contended further that even if it were, it was also
doing business in other states so as to avoid imposition
of a tax under the following statute:
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"If a corporation is subject to a tax under
the provisions of this article of the tax law, and
it maintains no regular place of business outside
of this state, except a statutory office, it shall be
taxed on a base measured by its entire net income,
or entire issued capital stock, or otherwise; as
hereinbefore provided.''
It would be difficult to provide more specifically for
the taxation of such a corporation as the American Investment Company under the facts of its operation, which
the defendant feels are established by the record in this
case. The Graves case, therefore, gives a square decision
as to the validity of a statute taxing such a corporation
on its entire net income. As to what the Allied Tobacco
Corporation was doing, the court said:
"It did not rent an office, but owned office
furniture located in the offices occupied by its
president and vice president in New York City,
and there had part-time office employees drawing
varying aggregate annual salaries up to $6,500.
:Meetings of the directors were held at this office.
It had no other office except the statutory office
in Delaware. It incurred expenses in New York
for legal services, printing, stationery, postage,
rental of safe deposit vault, and for stock registry
and stamps. In reports to the State Tax Department it stated its business to be trading and dealing in securities '" * *.''

After holding that a corporation's activities constituted "business" within the requirements of the New
York statute, and that carrying on an investment busi-
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ness is doing business, even though the stocks held represented corporations operating in other states than New
York, the court said:
"The assertion that petitioner's capital was
all outside the State of New York rests upon the
ancient 1uaxiln (nwbilia sequuntur personmn)
that uwvables follow the person of the owner, and
that as petitioner secured its franchise to be a
corporation in Delaware, the juristic concept follows that its person, and therefore its intangible
property, was there. Latterly intangibles have
been determined to have a taxable situs of their
own which may be away from the domicile of the
owner if they have become integral parts of some
local business. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
State of :Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 213, 50 St. Ct.
98, 74 L~ Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000. The certificates of stock kept in New York, to be traded in
there, had acquired a 'business situs' and a 'cornmercia! domicile' there at the place where 'the
management functioned.' (vVheeling Steel Corp.
v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L. I-Dd.
1143.)"
In Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre and H. R. R. Co.,
251 Pa. 6, 95 Atl. 915, there was before the Pennsylvania
court a New Jersey corporation authorized to hold bonds,
stocks and other securities of public or pri~ate transportation or other utility companies. It owned the stock of
some utilities within the State of Pennsylvania (as plaintiff owned the stock of a Utah bank) and established its
principal office in the State of Pennsylvania. Although
differing fron1 plaintiff in that the "\Vilkes-Barre Con1-
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pany held only stock of Pennsylvania operating companies, it was like the instant case in that the company
held stocks at its principal office where its general corporate functions were carried on. Under our statute, the
Wilkes-Barre Company would probably be a holding
company, and, therefore, within the exernption, but on
the question of the power of the state to impose a tax,
the case is a good precedent for the instant case. The
court there said :

"It does not appear the acts which were done
in this State were a mere incident of defendant's
corporate existence, but were the performance of
the function and business of the corporation itself.
Taking the various acts, which are admittedly
done in this State, namely, the holding of directors' meetings, the maintenance of a bank
account, the purchase of the stock and bonds of
the Pennsylvania corporations as one of the
direct objects of its incorporation, the residence
of the treasurer in Pennsylvania and the performance of every act necessary to the actual business
which the company is transacting and they clearly constitute a doing business within this State.''
A similar case is Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.
v. Rhodes, 37 R. I. 141, 94 Atl. 50, where it was held that
a corporation is "carrying on business" in Rhode Island ''if it is doing some of the work or is exercising
some of the functions for which it was created". And
in People ex rei. Manhattan Silk Co. v. Miller, (1908)
125 App. Div. 296, 109 N. Y. S. 866, affirmed 197 N. Y.
577, 91 N. E. 1119, it was held that holding stock for in-
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vesbnent constitutes the doing of business for profit for
tax purposes.
A somewhat analogous problen1 is raised by corporations which hold real or personal property in other states
upon rental which they receive and distribute in the state
seeking to i1npose the tax. It is held on these facts that
the corporation is doing business for franchise tax purposes.
State v. National Cash Credit Ass 'n, 224 Ala.
629, 141 So. 541;
:Maguire v. Tax Com1nission, 230 :Mass. 503,
120 N. E. 162, Aff 'd. 253 U. S. 12.
These authorities establish the power of a state to
tax income received by its residents or by foreign corporations having their principal places of business within
the state. They establish also that the activities incident to holding stock for management, or investment
of funds by a corporation constitute doing business. A
franchise tax is therefore valid as applied to a foreign
corporation with its only place of business in Utah, whose
corporate functions consist of investment of funds, transactions in securities, holding stocks for management of
the corporations, and the usual internal corporate affairs.
A re-examination of the principles governing the
First Security case, is therefore, appropriate. If a foreign corporation is doing business in this state, thereby
availing itself of our orderly laws, our opportunities and
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our protective forces, it is subject to franchise taxation
here. If its only place of business is in Utah all of its
income, from whatever source derived, is taxable. Utah
has seen fit, however, not to tax all of such income but
to make certain exemptions, one of which, relating to
holding companies, is based on the principle of avoiding
taxing the same earnings twice. If an operating company pays a franchise tax to the state based on its earnings and those earnings are passed on to its parent
corporation, it is reasonable to regard this as taxing the
same earnings twice and reason for exempting the parent corporation. But this principle was applied so as to
exempt holding companies only when their sole corporate functions were holding company functions. If the
corporation engages in other business, it loses its exemption. And the exemption does not exist unless all the
subsidiaries pay franchise tax in Utah; this is consistent
with the very reason for the exemption, which is to avoid
under some circumstances taxing the same operating
earnings twice. To say, as the First Security case does,
that this would compel foreign corporation subsidiaries
doing no business in Utah to pay the tax in order to
obtain an exemption for the parent is hardly accurate. A
tax on all the parent's earnings would be valid, from
whatever source derived, and that validity is not changed
by granting an exemption to other corporations when
the exemption is based on a reasonable classification. It
is not a question of forcing subsidiaries to pay a tax,
but rather of measuring the value of the franchise exer-
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cised by the parent in this state and, if solely a holding
company, granting an exetnption where the subsidiaries
have once paid a tax on earnings. The only constitutional question that should be considered is the reasonableness of the classification, which was definitely not the
basis of the holding in the First Security case.
But that case need not be overruled to uphold the
tax here. The court there assumed, as the parties desired, that the company met the first test of 80-13-5 (16),
and only the second test, namely, whether the subsidiaries paid a franchise tax in Utah, was examined. Here
it is strongly urged that the word" solely" in the ·statute
means "entirely" or "wholly", as it does in the dictionary, and that when a substantial part of plaintiff's
activities are other than those of a holding company, it is
not ''solely'' a holding company.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's wrong premise was unfortunate. If its
premise were established, the Commission would admit
that the franchise tax does not apply, because it would
not be doing business in Utah. But instead, plaintiff was
doing business only in Utah and not in any other state
in 1937, and it must, therefore, pay a franchise tax unle-ss
the statute exempts it. The act plainly applies, initially,
to a company doing the business of a holding company
and investment company in Utah. The exemption in
80-13-5 (16) does not apply to plaintiff for two reasons:
First, because it is not engaged solely in holding stocks
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of other corporations for the purpose of managing them;
and, second, its subsidiaries do not all pay corporation
franchise tax in Utah. As so applied, the law is valid from
a constitutional standpoint.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the decision of the defendant State Tax Commission be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
ALVIN I. SMITH,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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